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A Synthetic Approach to                           
Legal Adjudication 
SAMUEL C. RICKLESS* 
When faced with a dispute concerning how a given legal provision 
(whether constitutional or statutory) applies to a particular set of facts, 
how should a judge proceed?  It is commonplace to say that, in the first 
instance, she should look to the meanings of the words that constitute the 
provision itself.  If she is lucky, then the relevant meanings are clear; and 
if the facts are not in dispute, then the resolution is obvious.  Unfortunately, 
this rarely happens.  Almost every interesting dispute that arises under 
the law is the product of disagreement among reasonable and competent 
speakers of the language of the relevant provision.  If the meaning of the 
provision is not clear, then, even if the facts are fixed, how the judge 
should proceed is a matter of controversy.  A reasonable first step would 
be to consider the various factors to which she might reasonably appeal.  
In this respect, there are three main suggestions. 
One suggestion arises from the recognition that language is used for 
the purpose of communication, and that communication involves both a 
speaker and a hearer.  Especially in cases of ambiguity, a speaker might use 
a word intending it to mean one thing while the hearer may understand 
the same word to mean something else entirely.  It is perfectly conceivable 
that I should ask you to spray pesticides on the bank, meaning you to 
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spray the river bank, while you understand me to be asking you to spray 
the local savings-and-loan.  In determining how to apply a legal provision, a 
judge might therefore look to three kinds of meaning: (i) word meaning 
(what the words of the provision mean, considered independently of the 
intentions of those who adopted them and independently of the intentions of 
those to whom they are addressed), (ii) speaker meaning (what those 
who adopted the provision took it to mean), and (iii) hearer meaning 
(what those to whom the provision is addressed take it to mean). 
A second suggestion arises from the fact that legislators have a number 
of legislative intentions operating at different levels of generality.  A 
municipality might adopt an ordinance banning vehicles from the park in 
order to beautify the relevant neighborhood, improve public safety, 
reduce smog, or perhaps reduce noise.1  The same municipality might 
adopt the same ordinance with the more specific intention of removing 
skateboards or motorcycles from the park.  In determining how to apply 
such a provision, a judge might therefore look to one (or both) of two 
kinds of intention: general intention or purpose (what the legislators 
generally intend the provision to accomplish) and specific intention 
(how the legislators specifically intend the legislation to apply). 
A third suggestion arises from the widely held belief that it is part of a 
judge’s function to avoid serious injustice whenever possible.  Thus, 
though a basketball rule might state that “during an altercation, all 
players not participating in the game must remain in the immediate 
vicinity of their bench,” it seems unduly harsh to penalize a player for 
violating the rule if he left the bench during an altercation in order to go 
to the bathroom or if his purpose in leaving the bench was to prevent one 
of his teammates from harming a spectator.2  In determining how to 
apply such a rule, a judge might therefore look to a theory of justice or to 
moral theory more generally. 
As might be expected, those in the legal academy who have devised 
theories of legal adjudication have run with each of these suggestions.  
And because there is often a premium on theoretical simplicity, many 
theorists have sought to elevate one particular factor while denigrating 
the others.  In one camp, there are Textualists, for whom word or hearer 
meaning is paramount.  For the Old Textualists, the relevant kind of 
meaning is the “plain meaning” elucidated in the dictionary (word 
meaning).  For the New Textualists, the relevant kind of meaning is what 
any reasonable and competent hearer would understand the word to 
 1. The example is adapted from H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). 
 2. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH L. REV. 
1509, 1509–10 (1998). 
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mean in context (hearer meaning).  In another camp, there are committed 
Intentionalists, for whom some version of speaker meaning is 
paramount.  A number of these theorists are also Purposivists, inasmuch 
as they look to the general legislative intention or purpose driving the 
adoption of the relevant provision.  Finally, in yet another camp, there 
are Normativists, for whom moral theory is the touchstone of adjudication. 
The advocates in these various camps include some of the most 
brilliant legal minds of our generation.  It is difficult for me to believe 
that any one of them is completely mistaken.  It is far more likely that 
each of these advocates has glimpsed a part of the truth while the desire 
for theoretical simplicity blinds him to the reasonable criticisms of his 
opponents.  In my view, the proper theory of adjudication gives a suitably 
circumscribed role to each of word meaning, hearer meaning, speaker 
meaning, and moral theory.  I do not think of this view as a form of 
eclecticism.  It is principle, not whim or intuition, that explains why each 
of these factors deserves its place in the sun without dominating the 
others.  The most defensible theory of adjudication, I contend, is a principled 
synthesis of the main theoretical alternatives. 
Before laying out the reasons for adopting a synthetic approach, I want 
to emphasize that I am not proposing a theory of legal interpretation.  There 
are many who take for granted that the proper function of a judge is to 
interpret the law, in the sense of explicating its meaning: witness 
Alexander Hamilton’s dictum that “[t]he interpretation of the laws is the 
proper and peculiar province of the courts.”3  There is something to this: 
explication of meaning is certainly part of what judges should do when 
they adjudicate.  But the ultimate function of a judge is to adjudicate, 
that is, to resolve legal disputes, and there are many disputes that cannot, 
and many that should not, be resolved by appeal to the explication of 
meaning.  Consider, for example, whether the ordinance banning vehicles 
from the park should be held to apply to ceremonial tanks.4  On its own, 
no plausible account of the meaning of “vehicle” is sufficient to resolve 
this issue.  Or let us suppose that we all agree that the meaning of a text 
is what its author(s) intended it to mean.  If it should happen that those 
who promulgated the rule stating “no vehicles in the park” intended 
 3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright ed., 1961). 
 4. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and 
the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY  
357, 357–58, 380 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). 




these words as a code for “no dogs in the city” without apprising the 
inhabitants of the relevant municipality of this intention, then it would 
surely be wrong for a judge to hold that the ordinance bans dogs from 
the city, but does not ban cars from the park. 
A theory of adjudication is founded on a theory of the proper function 
of the law and of the proper function of judges in relation to the law, the 
other branches of government, and the citizens who are subject to the 
law.  As such, it is a branch of political theory rather than a branch of 
hermeneutics or the philosophy of language.  At the same time, because 
(in any theory of adjudication) it is at least part of a judge’s function to 
interpret the law, any political theorist who promises us an answer to the 
question with which we began should be open to insights that may be 
gleaned from contemporary semantic theory. 
With these preliminaries out of the way, let me begin by setting out 
some commonplace assumptions about the function of law and the 
functions of the branches of government that are responsible for creating, 
interpreting, and enforcing the law.5  The function of law is to constrain 
the behavior of those to whom it applies according to common and 
public rules.  It should be emphasized that laws cannot constrain behavior 
unless they are publicly accessible.  It is not necessary that citizens be 
familiar with every word of the legislative record; what is necessary is 
that it require no more than minimal effort for citizens to find the relevant 
provisions.  In a system wherein governmental legitimacy rests on the 
consent of the governed—and wherein it is unthinkable that the 
governed would consent to be bound by rules that are hidden from 
them—the publicity of law is fundamental.  This conception of the 
function of law issues in what has come to be known as one of the most 
important rule of law values: notice.  As Moore puts it, notice requires 
that citizens “know before they act what consequences the law will 
attach to their behavior.”6
In addition to the public, regulative function of law, it is also important to 
emphasize that, at least in legal regimes governed by written constitutions, 
there are different kinds of laws that have different legal status.  The 
function of any constitution is to serve as the blueprint for a society.  Its 
fundamental purpose is to create the various branches of government, 
stipulate their functions and powers, and articulate the ways in which 
they are designed to interact with each other and with the governed.  If 
the framers and ratifiers of the constitution happen to be suitably 
 5. I do not think of these assumptions as controversial.  But if you are inclined to 
reject them, then I offer the sequel as an attempt to articulate the consequences of these 
assumptions within a theory of adjudication. 
 6. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 
277, 316 (1985). 
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enlightened, then the constitution also functions as a repository of 
fundamental moral and political values, including a specification of legal 
rights that may not be abridged by ordinary legislation.7  In such a case, 
the system contains both fundamental law—established by constitutional 
ratification and, in some cases, encapsulating moral principles—and 
nonfundamental law, established by statute.  The only formal constraint 
on statutes in this system is that they be consistent with constitutional 
provisions; as a matter of political theory, there is no additional background 
requirement mandating the overall moral acceptability of statutes.8
Finally, let us consider what may be assumed about the functions of 
the various branches of government in a tripartite system such as the one 
in place in the United States.  In such a system, the legislative branch is 
responsible for making law, the executive branch is responsible for 
enforcing the law, and the judicial branch is responsible for deciding 
disputes that arise under the law.  Although there are circumstances in which 
the judiciary may find it necessary to strike down legislative enactments 
because they conflict with constitutional requirements, the function of 
the courts in relation to laws that do not so conflict is to give effect to the 
legislature’s semantic intentions in a way that respects the notice 
requirement.  Although judges and legislators are occasional antagonists, 
they are also partners in the greater scheme of preserving and protecting 
the legislature’s lawmaking function.  If matters were otherwise, then the 
system would allow for government by whim rather than by law. 
So much for political theory.  Let us now consider what may be learned 
from contemporary semantics.  Gottlob Frege once argued that, at least for 
the purposes of science, ordinary language contains infelicitous modes 
of expression, such as context dependence, ambiguity, and vagueness.9  
 7. Mind you, this is a contingent matter: considering the historical development 
of the U.S. Constitution, it should be kept in mind that the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights was largely a matter of historical chance.  If the Anti-Federalists had not 
screamed and hollered as they did, the greatest protection from government a citizen 
could hope for might well have remained for years at the level of a ban on such esoteric 
legal stratagems as bills of attainder and letters of marque. 
 8. Although many would argue that tax cuts for the super-rich would be immoral 
when public funds are scarce, few would deny that the tax cuts passed by Congress and 
signed into law by George W. Bush are legally binding. 
 9. GOTTLOB FREGE, On Sense and Meaning, in COLLECTED PAPERS ON MATHEMATICS, 
LOGIC, AND PHILOSOPHY 157, 169 (Brian McGuinness ed., Max Black trans., Basil Blackwell 
Publisher Ltd. 1984) (“The logic books contain warnings against logical mistakes arising 
from the ambiguity of expressions. . . .  It is therefore by no means unimportant to 
eliminate the source of these mistakes, at least in science, once and for all.”). 




We need not agree with Frege that these kinds of expression are always 
a barrier to efficient scientific communication, but it cannot be doubted 
that these three phenomena can get in the way of successful linguistic 
exchanges.10  Luckily, theorists of adjudication can safely ignore the 
phenomenon of explicit context sensitivity.  The reason for this is that 
explicitly context dependent expressions, such as indexicals (“I,” “you,” 
“today”) and demonstratives (“this,” “that”), are designed to refer to 
particulars; hence, they do not appear in statements, such as legal 
provisions, that are couched in general terms.  What cannot be ignored, 
however, is ambiguity, vagueness, and implicit context dependence. 
An ambiguous expression is associated with more than one meaning.  
Ambiguity in legal provisions generates disputes over how the provisions 
should apply to the facts.  Consider a case in which an expression E has two 
meanings, M1 and M2.  In the case of a dispute having its source in the 
ambiguity of E, one side will likely insist, and not without reason, that E 
be understood as having meaning M1, while the other side will insist, 
also not without reason, that E be understood as having meaning M2. 
A precise understanding of vagueness requires an understanding of the 
two main components of linguistic meaning, sense and reference.  
According to standard (Fregean) semantics, the sense of an expression is 
its contribution to the proposition expressed by any sentence of which it 
is a component, and the referent of an expression is the object or 
property that contributes to fixing the truth or falsity of the propositions 
expressed by the sentences of which it is a component.11  Among 
philosophers of language, argument rages over whether the sense of a 
singular term (proper name, indexical, demonstrative) is identical to its 
referent.12  But most philosophers of language would agree that there are 
cases in which the sense of an expression differs from its referent.  For 
example, many would agree that the sense of “bachelor” is not this or 
that bachelor, or even the set of all bachelors, but rather consists in some 
descriptive condition (such as the condition of being an unmarried 
eligible adult male) that determines what in the world is to count as a 
bachelor.  Argument also rages over whether sense always determines 
reference.13  But few would deny that it is often the case that the sense of 
 10. When my father drove my mother anywhere, it always drove him bats when 
she told him to go “that way.”  To this day, Mom continues to insist that Dad should 
have known that “that way” means “left.” 
 11. See generally FREGE, supra note 9. 
 12. For a summary of the debate, see generally DAVID KAPLAN, Demonstratives: 
An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives 
and Other Indexicals, in THEMES FROM KAPLAN 481 (Joseph Almog et al. eds., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1989). 
 13. See generally 2 HILARY PUTNAM, The Meaning of ‘Meaning’, in MIND, 
LANGUAGE, AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 215 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1975). 
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an expression fixes its referent.  Thus, the referent (or extension) of the 
term “bachelor” is determined by the descriptive condition that is the 
term’s sense. 
A vague expression has a sense that does not clearly fix what is to 
count as its referent.  The word “bald” is vague because the descriptive 
condition associated with it does not, by itself, determine whether someone 
with some, but very little, hair on his head is to be counted as an element 
of the word’s extension.  By contrast, the arithmetical descriptor “even,” 
as applied to the natural numbers, is not vague, since the descriptive 
condition associated with it (namely, the condition of being divisible 
by two) fixes exactly which objects belong in the word’s extension.  
Vagueness, no less than ambiguity, has the potential to generate legal 
disputes.  Consider the now familiar municipal ordinance banning vehicles 
from the park.  The problem here is that the sense of the word “vehicle” 
does not precisely fix the word’s extension.  The local veteran’s association 
wants to place a ceremonial tank in the park as part of a war memorial.  
The city council refuses to go along.  A judge must decide whether the 
word “vehicle” applies to ceremonial tanks.  The descriptive condition 
associated with “vehicle” (roughly, the condition of being able to carry 
persons from one place to another) does not provide sufficient guidance 
here.  A ceremonial tank could move if it had an engine.  But, of course, 
there is a sense in which the tank cannot move if it does not have an 
engine. 
The phenomenon of implicit context sensitivity is best explicated with 
the help of examples.  The word “I” is explicitly context sensitive in the 
sense that its referent is quite plainly determined in part by the context of 
utterance; when it is uttered by me, the word refers to me, but when it is 
uttered by you, the word refers to you.  By contrast, the word “tall” is 
only implicitly context sensitive.  Although its referent is determined in 
part by the context of utterance, this fact is not immediately apparent.  In 
the typical case, the set of individuals “tall” contributes to picking out is 
determined by the noun with which “tall” is combined.  A tall athlete is 
an athlete who is taller than average when compared to athletes.  But a 
tall basketball player is not a basketball player who is taller than average 
when compared to athletes: a tall basketball player is a basketball player 
who is taller than average when compared to basketball players.  Now, 
imagine a rule applying to basketball players that says: “If you are tall, 
then your health care premium is higher than it would be if you were 
short.”  To whom exactly does this rule apply?  Does it apply to basketball 




players of greater than average height for a person?  Does it apply if 
they are of greater than average height for an athlete?  Or does it apply 
to those who are of greater than average height for a basketball player?  
The problem here is neither that the word “tall” has multiple meanings, 
nor that the word is vague.  The problem is that the word is context 
sensitive. 
With the help of the basic assumptions of political theory outlined 
above and an understanding of the sorts of linguistic phenomena that 
have the potential to (and standardly do) generate legal disputes, it is 
possible to begin the task of describing and defending a synthetic theory 
of adjudication.  As noted above, there are situations in which a legal 
provision is unambiguous, precise, and context insensitive.  In such situations, 
disputes rarely arise.  But should the question be raised whether—and, if 
so, how—a particular provision applies in such circumstances, then the 
right answer is the one proposed by the Old Textualist.  Given that the 
text has a clear unitary meaning that determines a clear unitary referent 
(or extension) and that this should be plain to any competent speaker of 
the relevant language, the judge should hold that the text should be 
understood in light of its plain meaning and applied to those objects that 
fall under the extensions fixed by the senses of the relevant words.  
Here, an Old Textualist approach is consistent with a proper conception 
of the function of law, a proper conception of the judiciary’s function in 
a tripartite system of government, and rule of law values, including 
notice. 
For example, there is no question that, as things now stand, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger cannot be elected President of the United States.  
Article II, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution states that “No Person except 
a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the 
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President.”14  
The meaning of the provision is clear.  A citizen is “natural born” if he 
was born on U.S. territory.  Moreover, the Constitution was “adopted,” that 
is, went into effect, in 1789.  Because, as a matter of fact, Schwarzenegger 
was born in Austria many years after the Constitution was adopted, 
Article II, Section 4 clearly entails that he is not eligible to be President. 
Old Textualism is a recipe for a perfect world, but the world is not 
perfect.  Let us start with what judges should do in the face of ambiguity.  
In our “bank” example, a city ordinance requires me to spray the bank 
with pesticides.  I think that the rule requires me to spray the river bank, 
but the city wants me to spray the local credit union.  The city takes me 
to court.  How should the judge decide how the relevant rule applies?  
Old Textualism provides no assistance here.  Some other approach is 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
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needed, and (semantic) Intentionalism fits the bill.  It seems perfectly 
correct for the judge to rely on the semantic intentions of those who 
promulgated the rule in the first place.  If the members of the city council 
used the word “bank” to mean “financial institution,” then the judge’s 
decision should favor the city.  This is consistent with the assumption that 
the function of the courts is to give effect to (constitutionally constrained) 
legislative intentions. 
It might be objected that allowing legislative intent to determine the 
outcome of a dispute generated by ambiguity is not in fact consistent 
with the rule of law requirement of notice.  After all, the intentions of 
legislators are not immediately accessible to the governed, for whom it 
might be a significant burden to sift through the legislative record to 
reconstruct the semantic intentions of a collective.  But I do not think it 
is too onerous to expect the governed to check for easily accessible 
evidence of legislative intent.  If it is obvious from the public legislative 
record that the relevant rulemaking body intended an ambiguous word to 
be read one way rather than another (for example, the “bank” provision 
falls under a general provision governing the proper care and maintenance 
of financial institutions), then it gives too much power to individuals—and 
too little power to the legislature—to read the relevant rule as having a 
meaning distinct from the one originally intended. 
But to say that Intentionalism is the proper theory of adjudication in 
cases of ambiguity is not to say that Intentionalism (or even Intentionalism 
combined with Old-Textualism-for-easy-cases) is the proper theory of 
adjudication in every case.  It is a good thing, too, for Intentionalism is 
an inappropriate response to vagueness.15  Consider Justice Scalia’s 
example of the legislative provision imposing additional criminal penalties 
on those who “use a gun” in the course of committing a felony.16  The 
problem here is not that the word “use” is ambiguous; the problem is 
that its meaning in the given context is vague.  It is unclear whether 
“using a gun” applies only to cases in which the gun is brandished or 
applies more widely to cases in which the gun is merely employed as 
part of a felonious activity or transaction.  If a criminal employed an 
 15. It is also an inappropriate response to context sensitivity.  I invite the reader to 
apply my remarks favoring New Textualism over both Old Textualism and Intentionalism 
in cases of vagueness to cases of context sensitivity.  The arguments are perfectly 
parallel. 
 16. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 23–24 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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unloaded gun to hold his trousers up during a drug deal, would this 
count as “using” the gun in the relevant sense? 
In this sort of case, what seems to matter is not so much what sorts of 
“uses” the members of the legislature intended (or might have thought) 
to include as part of the extension of “use.”  What matters, as New 
Textualists argue, is what a competent and reasonably well-informed 
reader of the relevant provision would consider to be part of the word’s 
extension.  As Scalia notes, anyone subject to this law (except perhaps 
those who enacted it) would assume that trouser propping employment is 
not part of the extension of this particular use of “use.”  Rather, what 
seems at issue is whether the weapon was brandished—whether it was 
functioning as a threat to life or health. 
The reason for choosing hearer meaning over speaker meaning in this 
sort of case is that this is the only choice that respects the notice 
requirement.  Although citizens can be expected to determine the semantic 
intentions of their legislators (as in the “bank” example), they simply 
cannot be expected to determine their legislators’ referential intentions.  
Some legislators never stated what sorts of cases they would expect to 
fall under the relevant provision, and no legislator can be expected to 
state exactly how she would understand a vague provision to apply in all 
cases.  Moreover, because most enactments have their source in legislative 
compromise, it is typical for legislators to expect vague provisions to 
apply in different ways.  Half of the legislative body might vote for a 
provision thinking that it applies to a broad range of gun uses, and half 
might vote for it thinking that it applies to a much narrower range of 
uses.  According to Intentionalism, there is no principled way to decide 
which of these intentions should predominate.  If any reasonable person 
who understands the relevant provision would take it to apply narrowly, 
then this is how a judge should take it to apply.  For, under these conditions, 
it seems highly unjust for citizens to be held to a “precisification” of a 
vague provision that they could not and would not have anticipated in 
the ordinary course of events. 
It might be thought that the right way to think about the gun use 
example involves appeal to general (as opposed to specific, referential) 
legislative intentions.  It is reasonable to think that the relevant provision 
was enacted for a reason, namely, to discourage the threatening use of 
weapons during the commission of a felony.  Perhaps the New Textualist 
way out of the vagueness problem seems promising only because what a 
reasonable and competent speaker understands in this case is informed 
by an unarticulated sense of the provision’s purpose.  But this Purposivist 
objection is not persuasive.  It is also reasonable to think that the relevant 
provision was enacted for a different reason, namely, to discourage 
persons from having any weapons handy when they commit felonies.  
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Like the referential Intentionalist, the Purposivist can provide no 
principled way to decide among different purposes legislators might 
have had in mind when they voted for the relevant provision.  Whether 
appeal is made to general or specific intentions, all Intentionalists are in 
the same leaky boat. 
The conclusion to draw from this is that there is a restricted set of 
cases to which a particularly narrow form of Intentionalism properly 
applies.  This set includes all cases in which a judge must choose among 
multiple meanings in case of ambiguity.  In these cases, the judge is 
required to follow the legislators’ semantic intentions.  The same applies 
in cases of formal (as opposed to substantive) scrivener’s error.  A 
formal scrivener’s error is an obvious typographical mistake.  Consider 
the example of a provision regulating fisheries that mentions “carp” 
seventeen times and “cars” only once and in a context in which it is clear 
that “carp” is intended.17  Here, it is clear that legislators’ semantic intentions 
should count for more than any version of hearer meaning.  Where there 
is formal scrivener’s error, speaker meaning should predominate. 
Notice, however, that the same cannot be said for substantive scrivener’s 
error.  As in the case of formal scrivener’s error, substantive scrivener’s 
error arises when the legislature intends the language of the provision to 
be read one way, but drafts it in such a way as to say something else.  
The difference between the two kinds of error is that in substantive 
scrivener’s error there is no clear evidence to suggest that there was any 
sort of typographical mistake.  For example, imagine a statute that was 
originally intended to apply to both defendants and plaintiffs, but in 
which the word “plaintiff” was left out as the result of a typographical 
error.  Imagine further that the statute becomes law without any legislators 
having noticed the error.  Should the law be read as applying to plaintiffs?  
The answer is surely no.  Citizens who read the relevant provision can make 
sense of it without supposing that it contains any sort of typographical 
error.  In accordance with the notice requirement, it would place an 
undue burden on citizens to require them to determine, of any piece of 
seemingly clear legislation, whether it includes typographical omissions.  
Once the error is discovered, there is nothing to prevent the legislature 
from amending the statute to make it apply to plaintiffs.  But before the 
amendment takes effect, there is no reason to saddle hapless plaintiffs 
 17. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” 
Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 980 
(2004). 




with legal infractions about which they could not have been expected to 
know. 
It follows from the discussion thus far that, aside from easy cases in 
which linguistic infelicities do not occur and cases of ambiguity, the 
proper theory of adjudication is New Textualist.  This is correct, as far as 
it goes.  But there is a raging battle among New Textualists over whether 
moral theory has any role to play in the process of adjudication.  On the 
one side, there are those (such as Scalia) who think that judges should 
never appeal to moral theory in deciding disputes under the law.18  As 
they see it, appeal to moral theory is tantamount to appeal to personal 
ideological prejudice.  For there are almost as many moral theories as 
there are moral theorists, and it would seem to follow—because judges 
who base their decisions on moral theory will need to choose among 
many moral theories—that there is nothing left but personal prejudice 
upon which such a choice could possibly be made.  On the other side, 
there are Normativists, such as Moore, who think that judges should 
always appeal to moral theory.19  As they see it, in constitutional systems 
of government, the constitution functions as the blueprint for a good 
society, and because all legislation is designed to give effect to the 
blueprint, disputes over the application of statutes, no less than disputes 
over the application of constitutional provisions, are to be decided in 
light of what is optimal from the moral point of view. 
The way out of this debate is to recognize that there is a place for both 
Normativism and New Textualism in the theory of adjudication.  In 
effect, there are circumstances under which New Textualist judges must 
appeal to normative theory.  These circumstances include disputes over 
the proper application of provisions containing words of explicit 
normative import—words such as just compensation, equal protection, 
due process, cruel punishment, and freedom of speech.  Such phrases are 
imbued with moral significance, but they are also vague.  The fact that 
they are vague is, as I have argued, the main reason for adopting a New 
Textualist approach to resolve disputes over how they should be applied 
to particular sets of facts.  But New Textualism is not so much mistaken 
as it is limited in the amount of guidance it gives judges under these 
circumstances.  For example, in part because of its vagueness, the 
 18. See Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 129, 133, 136 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (responding to Professor 
Tribe) (“Judges are not, however, naturally appropriate expositors of the [moral] 
aspirations of a particular age . . . .”). 
 19. See Moore, supra note 6, at 376 (“A natural law theory of interpretation will 
say that values can and should enter into the decision of every case and that real values, 
not just conventional mores, are the values that should be looked to by judges. . . .  I shall 
defend both of these natural lawyer’s assertions.”). 
RICKLESS.DOC 6/6/2005  8:46 AM 
[VOL. 42:  519, 2005]  A Synthetic Approach to Legal Adjudication 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 531 
 
meaning of the word “cruel” will not, on its own, determine whether this 
or that form of punishment is cruel.  A principled New Textualist judge 
who refuses to look at moral theory ought simply to throw up her hands 
when asked to decide whether, say, lethal injections are cruel.  But, of 
course, this is something she cannot do.  She must decide, and she must 
decide in a way that is not ad hoc.  If the vague word is imbued with 
normative significance, then there is no way but to consider various 
moral theoretic approaches to clarifying the extension of the term.  A 
form of punishment is cruel if it inflicts pain gratuitously.  This much is 
clear.  But what makes it the case that a certain pain infliction is gratuitous 
or unjustified?  This is the kind of question that only moral theory can 
answer. 
The upshot of all this is that there is a place for moral theory in the 
theory of adjudication.  But notice that this role is restricted to the 
adjudication of disputes over the proper application of words that have 
normative import.  In other cases, moral theory takes a back seat to some 
form of word, hearer, or speaker meaning.  For example, although it may 
be morally wrong to restrict eligibility for the office of President to 
natural born citizens, it would not be justified for a judge to read Article 
II, Section 4 in accordance with moral theory and, as a result, permit 
Schwarzenegger to run for the Presidency. 
It might be objected that constitutions are not merely ways of setting 
up systems of government, but ways of setting up good systems of 
government.  If we accept this, then we must indeed accept the pervasiveness 
of moral theory in legal adjudication.  Unfortunately for Normativists, 
however, a constitution is not, per se, a blueprint for a good society.  A 
constitution, by its nature, is no more than a blueprint for a system of 
government.  There are constitutions that set up evil, as well as good, 
systems of government.  The U.S. Constitution is pretty good, on the 
whole.  But this is because the U.S. Constitution sets up more than a 
system of government; it also sets up significant limits to what government 
may do, particularly in the way it treats its citizens.  It does this by 
helping itself to normative language, the proper application of which 
requires nonpervasive appeal to moral theory.20
 20. Consider the case of United States v. Kirby, in which a sheriff who had 
arrested a wanted murderer on his mail rounds was prosecuted for violating a statute 
prohibiting obstruction of the passage of mail.  United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
482, 483 (1868).  Moore claims that this case supports the Normativist assertion that 
“there is a general ‘safety-valve’ question of justice that must be asked in all interpretation.”  




We have arrived at the following conclusion.  In the theory of legal 
adjudication, each of Old Textualism, New Textualism, Intentionalism, 
and Normativism has a role to play.  But the role of each theory is heavily 
circumscribed.  Old Textualism applies to the easiest cases, the cases in 
which the relevant dispute does not concern an ambiguous, vague, or 
context sensitive piece of language.  Intentionalism applies when a dispute 
hinges on the resolution of ambiguity.  New Textualism applies when 
the relevant provision is unambiguous (or has been disambiguated), but 
remains either vague or context sensitive.  And Normativism applies 
when the unambiguous or disambiguated provision contains language of 
normative import.  There is, then, a robust sense in which the proponents 
of all these theories are right.  But there is also a robust sense in which 
the typical proponent of each theory is mistaken.  For each proponent 
insists that his theory applies in each and every case.  And, in this, he is 
wrong.  It would be a mistake to adopt a New Textualist approach to the 
resolution of ambiguity, and it would be no less of a mistake to adopt an 
Intentionalist approach to the resolution of vagueness.  It would be a 
mistake to adopt an Old Textualist approach to language containing 
linguistic infelicity, and it would be no less of a mistake to adopt a 
Normativist approach to nonnormative language containing no linguistic 
infelicity whatever.  If there is a moral here, it is that different linguistic 
problems demand different solutions.  Once each theory is given its due 
and its supporters come to recognize that it does not apply beyond its 
proper domain, the road is open to synthesis, and, ultimately, theoretical 
reconciliation. 
 
Moore, supra note 6, at 387.  But this is too quick.  What this case illustrates is the 
possibility of conflict between legal duties.  On the one hand, sheriffs have a legal duty 
(qua sheriffs) to arrest wanted murderers.  On the other hand, sheriffs have a legal duty 
(qua citizens) not to obstruct the passage of mail.  The Kirby case is one in which these 
duties appear to conflict.  The first question a judge should ask here is whether it was 
possible for the sheriff to discharge both duties, for example, by waiting until the wanted 
murderer had finished his shift as a mail carrier.  If the answer to this question is yes, 
then the sheriff should be found guilty.  Suppose now that the mail carrier was suspected 
of committing murder while he was delivering the mail, or that there was evidence 
indicating that he might be a danger to others while on his delivery rounds.  In that case, 
the mail carrier’s arrest is justified, but only on standard exigency grounds.  In any event, 
this case provides no support for the Normativist thesis that every law contains an 
implicit “prevention of injustice” proviso. 
